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１．Introduction 
 
  Determinants of capital structure have been one of the most important issues in 
corporate finance.  Modigliani and Miller (1963) point out that when corporate tax 
exists, more leveraged firms have higher firm values due to the tax-saving effects of 
debt.  At the same time, more leveraged firms have a higher probability of financial 
distress.  The tradeoff theory of capital structure argues that firms choose the optimal 
debt ratio by comparing the present values of additional tax savings and of the 
additional expected cost of financial distress caused by marginal increase of debt.    The 
present value of the tax savings of fixed amount of debt D is τD (where τ: corporate tax 
rate), so that a higher marginal corporate tax rate increases the present value of the tax 
savings of debt.  Thus, firms with higher marginal corporate tax rates tend to have 
higher debt ratios.  However, the pecking order theory of financial choices supposes 
that firms have certain priorities among alternative financial choices when they raise 
capital.    Firms raise capital from retained earnings first, then by borrowing, and finally 
by new issue of equity.  In the pecking order theory, marginal corporate tax does not 
play a very important role in the choice of financing methods.  Thus,  understanding  the 
effects of the marginal corporate tax rate on firms’ debt policy is crucial for evaluating 
alternative theories of capital structure. 
    In the area of public finance, recent debate about corporate tax reform has focused on 
the consequences of asymmetric tax treatment of equity and debt.  To avoid the 
possible distortion of debt-equity choices by asymmetric tax treatment, most drastic 
corporate tax reform proposals, such as the comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) 
proposal by the U.S. Treasury and the proposals of Mirrlees Review, emphasize equal 
treatment of equity and debt.    Furthermore, the recent studies on the role of tax policy 
in financial crisis stress that asymmetric tax treatment may have caused excess leverage.   
Thus, the necessity of the proposed corporate tax reforms depends on the magnitude of 
distortion caused by the asymmetric tax treatment of equity and debt. 
  Despite  its  crucial  importance,  relatively  limited empirical studies have been done on 
the effects of marginal corporate tax on debt policy, although Graham (1996) and the 
subsequent studies have confirmed that marginal corporate tax rate does affect the debt 
policies of U.S. firms. In Japan, as far as we know, no empirical study of the effects of 
simulated marginal tax rates on debt policy has previously been conducted.     
  In this analysis, we estimate the marginal tax rates of individual firms following 
Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996), and we study the relationship between simulated marginal tax rates and the debt policies of Japanese firms.  Based on the regression 
results using the cross section or panel data of listed firms, we find that the marginal tax 
rate affects the debt policy of Japanese firms in most cases.  This result is consistent 
with previous research, such as Graham (1996). 
  In Section 2, we present a brief review of recent Japanese corporate tax changes and 
firms’ debt policy.  In Section 3, we review the existing literature on the relationship 
between marginal tax rates and the debt policies of firms in the U.S. and Japan.  In 
Section 4, we estimate the marginal corporate tax rates of individual firms by the Monte 
Carlo method, following Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996).    In Section 5, we explain 
the dependent variable, control variables and data used in our regressions.    In Section 6, 
we present the results of the regressions using the cross section data of firms in FY2008 
and discuss their implications.    In Section 7, we present some robustness checks of the 
basic results.    In Section 8, we construct a panel including the data on individual firms 
from FY2006 to FY2008.  We conduct the cross section regressions for FY2006, 
FY2007 and FY2008 first, and then we conduct the panel regression with fixed time 
effects and/or firm-specific fixed effects.  Based on these regressions, we confirm that 




2. Recent Japanese corporate tax changes and firms’ debt policy 
 
2.1 Changes of statutory tax rates on corporate income in Japan 
 
 The basic rate of Japanese corporate tax (national tax) was gradually raised after the 
1970s and reached up to 43.3%.    However, in the fundamental tax reform in late 1980, 
the corporate tax rate was reduced gradually to 37.5% in 1990.  After the financial 
crisis, it was reduced to 34.5% with the enlargement of the tax base in 1998 and further 
reduced to 30% in 1999.    The current corporate tax rate stands at 30%. 
 There are also local taxes on corporate income, such as corporate inhabitant tax and 
corporate enterprise tax. One of the tax bases of corporate inhabitant tax (local tax) is 
the amount of corporate tax (national tax) before tax credits.    The current standard rate 
of corporate inhabitant tax is 5.0% for prefectures and 12.3% for municipalities.  
Corporate enterprise tax is imposed not only on corporate income but also on 
value-added and corporate equity.  The corporate enterprise tax rate on corporate 
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1.  The effective tax rate 
of local taxes on corporate income was also gradually reduced from 17.40% in 1984 to 
11.56% in 2004. 
  The calculation of the effective tax rate of the sum of national and local taxes on 
corporate income is shown in formula (7) in Section 3.    The effective tax rate has been 
decreasing since the fundamental tax reform in late 1980s and is currently 39.54%. 
 
2.2 Japanese firms’ debt policy 
 
  Until recently, high debt ratio was recognized as an important characteristic of the 
capital structure of Japanese firms.  During the postwar rapid economic growth era of 
Japan, most Japanese firms financed their active equipment investment mainly by 
borrowing from banks.  The debt ratio of Japanese firms was more than 80% in the 
1970s.  However, after the 1970s, equity finance increased gradually, so that the debt 
ratio of Japanese firms started to decline. As shown in Figure 1, the debt ratio continued 
to decline in the 1980s, especially when equity finance surged in response to asset 
bubbles in the late 1980s.    After the collapse of the asset bubbles, while the amount of 
equity finance decreased, equipment investment demand also fell, and the debt ratio 
declined further.  After experiencing financial crisis in the late 1990s, Japanese firms 
made serious efforts to reduce debt up until mid-2000s, and the debt ratio of Japanese 
firms dropped to about 65%.  However, after FY2005, the debt ratio changes seemed 
to have stabilized.  The debt ratios of the listed Japanese firms were 65.35% in 
FY2006, 64.33% in FY2007 and 64.98% in FY2008.  In FY2009, due to Lehman 
shocks, Japanese firms experienced negative shocks, and the debt ratio increased to 
66.85%. 
  The relatively high debt ratio of Japanese firms was often compared with the 
relatively low debt ratio of U.S. firms in the 1960s and 1970s.  Because highly 
leveraged firms enjoyed more tax savings, American corporate managers complained 
that Japanese firms enjoyed the advantage of a lower cost of capital due to their high 
debt ratio.  However, without basic knowledge of modern corporate finance theory, 
Japanese corporate managers and industrial policy makers believed that only dividend 
payments contributed to the cost of equity capital.  Thus, they complained that U. S. 
firms had a lower cost of capital because their debt ratio was relatively lower.    Even in 
                                                        
1  While there is also a “special regional corporate tax” that was introduced in October 2008, the 
combined tax rate of the corporate enterprise tax and special regional corporate tax is adjusted to be 
almost the same as the tax rate of the corporate enterprise tax before the introduction of the special 
regional corporate tax. 
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one of the important factors in their decision regarding the optimal debt ratio in the 
survey by Akaishi et al. (1998).  Hotei and Kunieda (2008) also empirically confirm 
that Japanese corporate managers did not determine their dividend policy in a way 
consistent with modern corporate finance theory before the 2000s. 
However, facing strong pressure from foreign investors including hedge funds, 
Japanese firms tried to reform their corporate governance and financial policy in the 
2000s.    Especially after the Japanese consumer-product giant Kao introduced EVA® in 
2000, many Japanese large firms introduced EVA® or similar methods to improve their 
corporate performance
2.  To calculate EVA®, CFOs and other corporate managers 
needed to understand the concept of the after-tax weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC).  These experiences may have changed Japanese CFOs' understanding of the 
tax-saving effects of debt.     
Recognizing this possible change in Japanese firms’ debt policy decisions in the early 
2000s, this empirical study analyzes the effects of the firm-specific marginal tax rates 
on their debt policy in Japan in the late 2000s.  Another essential reason that we 
concentrate on the late 2000s is that the necessary data for estimating firm-specific 
marginal tax rates using the method of Graham (1996) have been available only since 
FY2000 in Japan, as we explain in more detail later.    However, because Japanese firms 
have been seriously damaged by the financial crisis since FY2009, we exclude the 
periods since FY2009.  Thus, we conduct the detailed cross section analysis using 
FY2008 data (the latest data before the serious damage of the Lehman shock on 
Japanese firms’ performance) and conduct the panel analysis using FY2006-2008 data.     




    Since Modigliani and Miller (1963), the possible importance of marginal tax rate has 
been well known in theory.    However, it seemed difficult to conduct an effective cross 
section analysis of a direct relationship between marginal tax rate and debt policy, as 
most large corporations face the same statutory tax rate.    Thus, previous research such 
as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) focused on the effects of non-debt tax shields (for 
example, depreciation) on debt policy, rather than on a direct relationship between 
marginal tax rate and debt policy. 
    However, Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Alshuler and Auerbach (1990) point out 
                                                        
2  EVA® (Economic Value Added) is the registered trademark of Stern Stewart & Co. 
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may not be equal to the statutory tax rate.  Namely, although the statutory tax rate is 
applied when the taxable income of a firm is positive, no corporate tax is imposed when 
the taxable income is negative.  Furthermore, there are “carry forward” and “carry 
back” of loss in the corporate tax system.  The existence of loss carried forward and 
loss carried back also causes differences in the marginal tax rates.     
  Recognizing the existence of loss carried forward and loss carried back in the U.S. 
corporate tax system, MacKie-Mason (1990) analyzes the effects of the marginal tax 
rate on debt policy.  That study found that when a firm has loss carried forward and 
investment tax credit (another tax shield), it tends to raise capital less by new debt issue.   
Because both existing loss carried forward and investment tax credit are substitutes for 
new debt issue for tax savings, this result is consistent with the tradeoff theory. 
However, Shevlin (1990) adopts the Monte Carlo method using a simple linear 
projection of taxable income based on actual past data to simulate future taxable income.   
Then, using simulated taxable income series and applying detailed corporate tax law, 
Shevlin (1990) estimates the (expected) marginal tax rates of individual firms.    Further, 
using Shevlin (1990)’s approach, Graham (1996) estimates the effects of marginal tax 
rate on U.S. firms' debt policy.  He finds a positive relationship between the 
firm-specific marginal tax rate and the change in debt ratio.    Based on a similar method, 
the effects of personal income tax on debt (Graham (1999))   and the importance of 
tax savings in firms’ values (Graham (2000)) are also analyzed.  In addition, there are 
other empirical studies using statutory tax rates or (effective) average tax rates as 
proxies for marginal tax rates.  For example, Gordon and Lee (2001) analyze the 
effects of marginal tax rates on debt policy using the differential tax treatment between 
large corporations and small corporations in the U.S., and they find that the difference in 
corporate tax rates has significant effects on debt policy.  However, the meta-study of 
the existing empirical studies by Feld et al. (2011) concludes that the simulated 
marginal tax rates suggested by Graham (1996) have an advantage in avoiding a 
significant downward bias in estimation.  In countries other than the U.S., while 
Alworth and Arachi (2001) conduct a similar analysis using a panel of data on Italian 
firms and find a positive relationship between firm-specific marginal tax rates and 
Italian firms’ debt policy, empirical studies of the relationship between the marginal tax 
rate and firms’ debt policy remain limited. (A comprehensive survey of related literature 
can be found in Graham (2003) and Graham (2006).) 
In Japan, several studies such as Matsuura, Takezawa and Suzuki (2000) and 
Nishioka and Baba (2004) have considered the determinants of Japanese firms’ debt 
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3.    While these studies recognize the possible tax-saving effects of corporate tax, 
they do not use the firm-specific marginal tax rate as a control variable in their 
regressions.  One exception is Kubota and Takehara (2007), who calculate the 
firm-specific marginal tax rates of Japanese firms using the estimation method of 
Shelvin (1990) and Graham (1996). However, because the main concern of Kubota and 
Takehara (2007) is to consider the appropriate cost of capital with sufficient 
consideration to the marginal tax rate, they offer no analysis of the relationship between 
firm-specific marginal tax rates and Japanese firms’ debt policy. 
In this paper, we consider the relationship between firm-specific marginal tax rates 
and Japanese firms’ debt policy.  In the next section, we estimate the firm-specific 
marginal tax rate following Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996). 
 
 
4. Estimation of Marginal Tax Rates of Individual Firms 
 
4.1 Estimation of taxable income of Japanese firms 
 
  Because the Japanese corporate tax system treats profit and loss asymmetrically and 
allows carryover of loss, estimating the marginal tax rates of individual firms can be 
very complicated. Thus, we estimate the marginal tax rates of Japanese firms by the 
Monte Carlo method.  After simulating the future taxable income of each firm, we 
estimate the marginal corporate tax rates based on the simulated taxable income.  Our 
estimation method is based on Shevlin (1990)’s estimation procedure, modified to 
reflect data availability and the differences between the corporate tax systems in U.S. 
and Japan. 
    As the first step of the estimation procedure, we forecast the future taxable income of 
individual firms.    Following Shevlin (1990), we assume that firm i’s taxable income at 
time t (denoted by TIi t) follows a random walk with drift.   
 
ΔTIi t = μi+εi t                                         (1) 
 
  where  ΔTIi t  ：the first difference in taxable income of firm i 
μi ： drift 
εi t：white noise 
                                                        
3  Previous studies of the determinants of debt ratio of Japanese firms before 2000 are summarized in 
Table 7.3 of Tsuji (2002). 
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  The drifts and white noises of equation (1) are estimated from taxable income series 
calculated from the actual financial data for individual firms during the sample period 
between FY2000 and FY2007
4.  The drift μi is set equal to the sample mean of ΔTIi t.  
The white noise εi t is distributed normally with a mean of zero and a variance equal to 
the variance of ΔTIi t of the sample period. 
  Then, we forecast firm i’s taxable income during the simulation period between 
FY2007 and FY2021 by drawing 14 random normal realizations of εi t and using 
equation  (1).   
 
4.2 Calculation of annual corporate tax bill 
   
  Using the simulated taxable income from FY2007 to FY2021, we calculate the 
corporate tax bill Ti,t (including the local corporate tax bill) of firm i in the accounting 
year t, using the effective corporate tax rates (including local corporate tax) and the loss 
carry forward and loss carry back rules of Japanese corporate tax system.  In the 
Japanese corporate tax system, carryover of loss is allowed for losses during the 
previous 7 years after tax law change of 2004.  This rule is applied to losses incurred 
since April 1, 2001.    (Before the tax law change of 2004, carry over was allowed only 
for losses during the previous 5 years.) 
  However, while the rule of loss carry back (only for one year) exists in Japanese 
corporate tax law, the rule has been suspended except for small firms.    Thus, we ignore 
the loss carry back in our calculation of the corporate tax bill, as we use the data of 
listed firms, which are large corporations. 
 
4.3 Simulating expected marginal tax rates 
 
We calculate the present value PV(Ti) of the future tax bills for FY2007 from the 















T PV               (2) 
 
                                                        
4  Most Japanese corporations’ fiscal years run from April 1 to March 31 of the following year.   
Thus, for those corporations, FY2000 implies the fiscal year running from April 1, 1999 through 
March 31, 2000.    Note that this usage is different from the usage of “FY2000” in Japanese, where 
FY2000 means the fiscal year starting in 2000. 
  9where R is the discount rate.  We use R=1.934%, the average of corporate bond 
interest rates (12 years) in 2006, which is reported in the Financial and Economic 
Monthly Statistics of the Bank of Japan
5. 
Then, after adding one Japanese yen to the taxable income values used above for 
every year from FY2007 to FY2021, we recalculate the annual corporate tax bills T’i t 
from FY2007 to FY2021 using the new taxable income values.  From these newly 
calculated annual corporate tax bills T’i t , we recalculate the present value PV(T’i) using 
















T PV                                 ( 3 )  
 
In addition, we calculate the present value PV(ΔY) of added taxable income (one 
Japanese yen every year) from FY2007 to FY2021.    The discount rate R is the same as 
before. 
 











Y PV                               ( 4 )  
 
Now, we can calculate the new marginal corporate tax rate τi from (2), (3) and (4). 
 
        
) (




T PV T PV

 
                    (5) 
 
While Shelvin (1990) and Graham (1996) repeat this procedure 50 times for each firm, 
we repeat this simulation 10,000 times for each firm to obtain more stable results.  
Then, the averages of those 10,000 estimated marginal corporate tax rates of firm i are 
termed the “(expected) marginal corporate tax rate (MTR) of firm i.”  This simulation 
is done for all sample firms. 
  Note that we consider the marginal tax increase in response to one Japanese yen 
increase in taxable income for every year rather than one Japanese yen increase in 
taxable income only for the initial period of the simulation period, as in Shevlin (1990), 
Graham (1996) and Kubota and Takehara (2007).  Because intentional debt policy is 
                                                        
5  Although Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996) use the corporate bond rates of individual firms, 
because not all Japanese listed firms issue long-term bonds, we use the average of corporate bond 
interest rates data for all firms. 
  10lumpy rather than smoothly incremental, it is reasonable to assume that intentional debt 
policy is decided based on a permanent increase rather than only a one-year increase in 
taxable income.  (However, as we show later in one of the robustness checks, we can 
see similar results even when we use the marginal tax rate based on an increase of one 
Japanese yen in taxable income.) 
 
4.4 Data   
 
  Following Shelvin (1990), taxable income TIi t is calculated using the formula below. 
 
rate tax  statutory    Effective
assets   deferred Net tax 
rm current te    the of profit  Pretax  (TI)   income   Taxable                   
 (6) 
 
The data on “Pretax profit of the current term” and “Net tax deferred assets” are based 
on Nikkei NEEDS data.  In Japan, “Tax Effect Accounting,” including the concept of 
net tax deferred assets, was first introduced in FY2000, so that we can calculate 
“taxable income” only since FY2000.     
    “Effective statutory tax rate” is defined by the next formula (7). 
 
Effective statutory tax rate

Corporate income tax rate(1 Corporate inhabitant tax rate) Corporate enterprise tax rate 
1 Corporate enterprise tax rate
                                                                    ( 7 )  
 
    For local taxes (corporate inhabitant tax and corporate enterprise tax), we will use the 
“standard” statutory tax rates of the local tax rates.  While the tax base of corporate 
enterprise tax on large corporations includes not only income but also shareholders’ 
equity (book value) and value added, we use only the corporate enterprise tax rate on 
income, as we focus on the tax increase caused by a marginal corporate income increase 
in this analysis.    The effective statutory tax rate calculated by (7) is 39.54%. 
  Sample firms include all listed firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  However, 
because we are interested in the effects of corporate tax on the debt policy of ordinary 
firms, we exclude banks from our sample.  Also, because a special method of 
corporate enterprise taxation is applied to the electronic power and gas industry and the 
insurance industry, we exclude the firms in those industries.   Furthermore, we exclude 
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Nikkei NEEDS database.    Then, the number of sample firms is 1,213.    All simulation 
of marginal tax rates was conducted using Microsoft Excel software. 
 
4.5 Results of simulation of marginal tax rates of individual firms 
 
    The average of the estimated marginal tax rates of all firms is 31.87%, which is much 
lower than the effective statutory rate (39.54%).  This gap is caused by asymmetrical 
tax treatment of profit and loss and by the loss carry forward provision in Japanese 
corporate tax system.    While many firms have marginal tax rates equal to the effective 
statutory tax rate (39.54%), many other firms face a wide variety of marginal tax rates.  
The standard deviation of the marginal tax rates is 9.51%, implying that there is 
moderate variation of the marginal tax rates of all firms. 
 
 
5. Determinants of Debt Policy 
 
  Using the simulated marginal tax rates of the sample firms, we analyze the 
determinants of firms’ debt policy by OLS.  The dependent variables and control 
variables are explained below.     
 
5.1 Dependent variable: ΔDEBT 
 
  Previous studies such as MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) show that it is 
more effective to analyze the change in debt ratio rather than the debt ratio itself to 
study the effects of the marginal tax rate on the debt policy of firms.  Based on their 
findings, we also focus on the change in debt ratio.  We define a dependent variable 
ΔDEBT as below. 
 
 
Income   ive Comprehens Other    Equity ｩ rs Shareholde abilities Current Li




                   
(8) 
 
    “Current Liabilities” and “Other Comprehensive Income“ are taken from the balance 
sheets of firms at the end of FY2008.  “Shareholders’ Equity” is measured by market 
price.   In Japan, the negative effects of the sub-prime problem were limited before the 
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negative shocks during the period of FY2009 and after.    We exclude the outliers whose 
values of ΔDEBT are less than μ(average of ΔDEBT)－5σ(standard deviation of 
ΔDEBT) or greater than μ＋5σ, implying that outliers are less than    -34.435  or greater 
than 33.058. According to this criterion, two outliers are excluded from the samples.  
Without these two outliers, the number of sample firms is 1,211.    The average value of 
ΔDEBT for all sample firms in FY2008 is －0.718%.  The negative average value 
implies that many Japanese firms were trying to reduce their debt ratio in FY2008. 
    MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) pointed out that ΔDEBT may be affected 
not only by intentional debt policy but also by the exogenous change in the market price 
of shareholders’ equity.  To focus on the debt ratio changes caused by intentional 
changes in debt policy, MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) conduct another 
regression using only the firms whose ΔDEBT is smaller than  －2% or larger than +2%.   
For convenience, we term those 772 firms with intentional debt policy “IDP firms”. The 
average of ΔDEBT of IDP firms in FY2008 is  －1.048%. 
 
5.2 Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) 
 
  The most important explanatory variable in this study is the marginal corporate tax 
rates (MTR) of individual firms simulated in the previous section.  Because more 
leveraged firms have a higher probability of loss, firms with higher debt ratios tend to 
have lower expected marginal tax rates.  To avoid the endogeneity problem caused by 
this relationship, MTR in the previous period is used as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions in the previous studies.  This choice can be justified by noting that 
important debt policy decisions in large corporations may take a long time before 
implementation.  Thus, the expected MTR at the end of FY2007 is used as an 
explanatory variable in the regressions, while ΔDEBT is calculated at the end of 
FY2008.  The average MTRs of all sample firms and of IDP firms in FY2007 are 
31.87% and 31.06%, respectively.     
    Because higher MRT raises the value of tax savings, the tradeoff theory predicts that 
the sign of the estimated coefficient with MTR is positive. 
 
5.3 Other Control Variables 
 
  The previous research of determinants of firms’ debt policy in the U.S. and Japan 
found that there are various other determinants of debt policy.  We also use other 
  13variables described below as control variables in our regressions.  Because the 
dependent variable (ΔDEBT) is the change of debt ratio, following Graham (1996), we 
use the changes in possible determinants as control variables, except for the variables 
SAFPROB, NDTS*SAFPROB, industry dummies, large shareholder ratio, foreign 
shareholder ratio and corporate group dummy.  The data are taken from Nikkei 
NEEDS and “Kaisha Shikiho (Quarterly Report of Corporations)” unless other sources 
are  mentioned.   
 
①  Bankruptcy probability index based on SAF2002 (SAFPROB) 
 
 The tradeoff theory of capital structure predicts that if the bankruptcy probability of a 
firm is higher, the expected cost of financial distress is higher, and the firm tends to 
reduce debt ratio.  The previous studies in the U.S. include a bankruptcy probability 
index based on accounting indexes such as Altman (1968)’s Z score in the control 
variables of the regression analysis
6.  
  In this analysis, we use an index based on SAF2002 (Simple Analysis of Failure 
2002), proposed by Shirota (2003, 2008) as a bankruptcy probability index of Japanese 
firms, as a control variable.  SAF2002 is bankruptcy probability index derived from 
four accounting indexes based on formula (9) below.  (This formula is a simplified 
version of the original.  More detailed definitions of the accounting indexes in the 









assets   Total
  rm current te    the if profit  Pretax 
682 . 2
assets   Total





   
                     
(9) 
 
 A higher SAF2002 means a lower probability of bankruptcy.  SAF2002 can be 
negative, while Altman (1968)’s Z score cannot be negative by definition.   
  MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) use the inverse of Altman (1968)’s Z 
score as a control variable.  Similarly, we use the inverse of SAF2002, but to avoid 
                                                        
6  In previous studies in Japan, the standard deviation of corporate income has often been used as a 
proxy for the bankruptcy probability index.    However, if corporate income is more volatile, because 
corporate income becomes negative more often, the expected MTR tends to be lower.    Thus, it 
seems inappropriate to use the standard deviation of corporate income as a control variable in the 
regression when we focus on the effects of MTR on debt policy. 
  14negative values, we use the variable defined by formula (10) below rather than a simple 
inverse.  We  call  this  bankruptcy probability index SAFPROB. 
 
             





                       ( 1 0 )  
        where  SAF2002min is the minimum value of SAF2002 of all sample firms. 
 
  SAFPROB is 1 for the firm with the lowest SAF2002 (=SAF2002min), implying its 
bankruptcy probability is the highest, while SAFPROB is lowest (but positive) for the 
firm with the highest SAF2002, implying its bankruptcy probability is lowest.  
  The tradeoff theory of capital structure predicts that firms with higher bankruptcy 
probabilities have stronger incentives to reduce debt ratio.  Thus, the expected sign of 
the coefficient with SAFPROB is negative. 
 
②  Non-debt tax shield “(ΔNDTS) and “NDTS*SAFPROB”(NDTSSAF) 
 
  DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) point out that not only debt but also other factors 
(“non-debt tax shield” or “NDTS”) such as depreciation have tax-saving effects.    They 
claim that because debt and non-debt tax shields are substitutes under the constraint of a 
limited amount of positive taxable income, the optimal debt ratio is lower when NDTS 
is larger.     
  However,  MacKie-Mason  (1990) criticizes their view by pointing out that firms with 
more profitable projects tend to have larger amounts of both depreciation and borrowing, 
and therefore NDTS may have a positive rather than a negative association with debt 
ratio.  Based on this recognition, MacKie-Mason (1990) introduces 
“NDTS*(bankruptcy probability index)” as another control variable in addition to 
NDTS.  According to MacKie-Mason (1990)’s argument, the expected sign of the 
coefficient of NDTS*(bankruptcy probability index) is negative, while the expected 
sign of the coefficient of NDTS is positive.   
  Following Mackie-Mason (1990), we introduce both NDTS and “NDTS*SAFPROB 
(‘NDTSSAF’ in short)” as control variables in the regressions, where SAFPROB is used 
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Following Graham (1996), we use the first differential of NDTS (ΔNDTS) as a control 
variable in the regression, but we use NDTSSAF without such differentiation.     
 
③ Free Cash Flow (ΔFCF) 
 
Jensen (1996)’s free cash flow hypothesis points out that because corporate 
managers tend to pursue their private benefit with ample free cash flow, a higher debt 
ratio may be preferred to discourage such misbehavior of managers in firms with larger 
free cash flow.  However, the pecking order theory of financing choices claims that a 
larger free cash flow provides cheaper capital for investment and reduces the necessity 
of more costly borrowing.  Based on these theories, we include the differential of free 
cash flow (ΔFCF) in our regressions.  Free cash flow (FCF) is defined as “Net cash 
from operating activities minus net cash used in investing activities” on the cash flow 
statement of firms.    The expected sign ofΔ FCF is positive based on the free cash flow 
hypothesis or negative based on the pecking order theory of financing choices. 
 
④  Investment opportunities: Price-book ratio of capital (ΔPBR) 
 
  The pecking order theory argues that firms with more investment opportunities may 
try to reduce debt ratio to avoid losing profitable opportunities due to a lack of relatively 
cheaper internal capital (Myers (1977), Slutz (1990)).  We use the price-book ratio of 
capital (PBR) as a proxy for investment opportunities, as in the previous studies.  It is 
supported that higher PBR reflects more profitable investment opportunities. Then, from 
the pecking order theory, the expected sign of PBR is negative.     
  However, there are other interpretations of the relationship between PBR and debt 
policy.  For example, the market timing hypothesis proposed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) points out that firms raise capital by issuing new equities when their managers 
observe over-evaluation of their corporate stocks in capital markets. Then, higher PBR 
firms prefer stocks rather than debt. However, if the bankruptcy probability of firms 
with high PBR is low, then the tradeoff theory predicts that higher PBR firms will tend 
to have higher debt ratio.  Thus, while we include the differential of PBR (ΔPBR) in 
                                                        
7  While not only depreciation but also investment tax credit (ITC) have often been included in 
NDTS in previous studies in the U.S., we include only depreciation, as investment tax credit is less 
important in Japanese corporate tax policy than in U.S. corporate tax policy. 
  16the regressions, the expected sign of ΔPBR can be positive or negative according to 
alternative views of capital structure. 
 
⑤  Firm size (ΔSIZE) 
 
    Previous studies have found that firm size is a significant determinant of debt policy.   
One view argues that because the bankruptcy probability of larger firms is lower due to 
their greater diversification of business, the tradeoff theory predicts that larger firms will 
have higher debt ratios.    Another view claims that because the asymmetric information 
problem between mangers and investors is less serious for larger firms, the free cash 
flow hypothesis predicts that larger firms do not need higher debt ratios. Thus, while we 
include the differential of SIZE (ΔSIZE) in the regression, the expected sign of the 
coefficient with ΔSIZE can be positive or negative.    Following Graham (1996), we use 
the log of sales as a proxy for firm ΔSIZE in the regression. 
 
⑥  Advertising Expense (ΔAD) and Research and Development (ΔRD) 
 
  Because intangible assets such as advertising expense (AD) and research and 
development (RD) are difficult to monitor, firms with more intangible assets may have 
more incentive for asset substitution.  Then, outside investors such as banks are 
reluctant to lend money to firms with more intangible assets.  Also, if advertising 
expense and research and development work as non-debt tax savings in addition to 
depreciation and ITC (Bradley et al. (1984)), firms with higher advertising expense and 
research and development will tend to have lower debt ratios.  Thus, we include both 
the differential of advertising expense as a percentage of sales (ΔAD) and the 
differential of research and development expenses as a percentage of sales (ΔRD).  
The expected signs of both coefficients are negative. 
 
⑦  Fixed asset ratio (ΔFAR) 
 
  If a higher fixed asset ratio (FAR) implies a lower probability of bankruptcy, the 
tradeoff theory predicts that firms with higher fixed ratios will tend to have lower debt 
ratios.  Furthermore, the view emphasizing the agency cost of debt also supports that 
expectation, as fixed assets can easily be used as collateral for debt.  We include the 
differential of the fixed asset ratio (ΔFAR), which is defined as fixed assets (“property, 
plant and equipment” in the balance sheet) divided by total assets (book value).  The 
  17expected sign of the coefficient with ΔFAR is positive. 
 
⑧  Return on assets (ΔROA) 
 
 The pecking order theory predicts that more profitable firms accumulating more 
internal funds depend less on borrowing.  The return rate of assets (=Pretax profit of 
the current term/Total assets (book value)) is used as a proxy for the profitability of 
firms.  The differential of ROA (ΔROA) is included as a control variable in the 
regressions. The expected sign of the coefficient with ΔROA is negative. 
 
⑨  Dummy for Industries (D1~D7) 
 
  The characteristics of firms’ debt policies can be different in different industries.  
Following Nishioka and Baba (2004), we use seven industry dummies: Construction 
(D1), Transportation (D2), Information and Communication (D3), Wholesale trade (D4), 
Retail trade (D5), Real estate (D6) and Services (D7) in the regression.  (The industry 
of each firm is identified according to its Tokyo Stock Exchange classification.)     
 
⑩  Large shareholder ratio (LSHARE) and Foreign shareholder ratio (FSHARE) 
 
    The existence of large shareholders improves the effectiveness of corporate 
governance (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).  Also, in Japan, it is believed that the 
existence of significant numbers of foreign shareholders improves corporate governance, 
as foreign shareholders are more active in monitoring the management.  According to 
the free cash flow hypothesis, the free cash flow of firms with ineffective corporate 
governance should be reduced by higher debt ratios.  Thus, firms with more large 
shareholders or more foreign shareholders will tend to have lower debt ratios.  We 
define the share of the top 10 largest shareholders as “large shareholder ratio 
(LSHARE)” and the share of foreign shareholders as “foreign shareholder ratio 
(FSHARE).  The expected signs of the coefficients for both LSHARE and FSHARE 
are negative. 
 
⑪  Corporate group dummy (DGROUP) 
 
  Hirota (1999) confirms that the firms affiliated with the six largest corporate groups 
(Keiretsu) in Japan have higher debt ratios.  Because the other members of the same 
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recognized that the probability of bankruptcy of the member firms of the six largest 
corporate groups is low.  This recognition of the low probability of bankruptcy 
explains the high debt ratio of the firms affiliated with the six largest corporate groups.  
Thus, we include corporate group dummy (DGROUP) as a control variable in the 
regressions.  To identify the membership of the six corporate groups, the previous 
studies have often used the membership of the CEOs’ meetings (“Shacho-kai”) listed in 
the book “Kigyo Keiretsu Soran (General guide of corporate groups)”.    However, after 
the several recent mergers of main banks, even the membership of the presidents’ 
meetings is not clear, with only a few exceptions.  In this study, we mainly follow the 
study of the membership of the CEO meetings in 2003 by Tanaka (2003).  If a firm’s 
CEO is considered to be a member of the CEO meetings of the former six largest 
corporate groups, the corporate group dummy (DGROUP) is one.  If not, it is zero.  
According to Hirota (1999), the expected sign of this coefficient is positive. 
 
Descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Table 1.  Eviews software is 
used for the regressions.  Because we find heteroskedasticity by White’s general test, 
we show White heteroskedasticity consistent estimators in all of the results below. 
 
 
6．Estimation Results   
 
6.1 Results of the regression using all sample firms 
 
The result of the regression using all sample firms (except outliers) is shown in the 
center column of Table 2.   
The estimated coefficient of the marginal tax rate (MTR) is 0.066, and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  This result supports the tradeoff theory of 
capital structure, predicting that firms with higher marginal tax rates will increase their 
debt ratio more rapidly, as the tax-saving effect of debt increases with increasing 
marginal tax rate. 
  The coefficient of the bankruptcy probability index (SAFPROB) is negative (－
5.977). This result is consistent with the tradeoff theory.  However, this coefficient is 
not statistically significant. 
  The coefficient of non-debt tax shield (ΔNDTS) is positive, while the coefficient of 
“NDTSSAF” is negative.  This result is consistent with MacKie-Mason (1990)’s 
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level. 
The coefficient of free cash flow (ΔFCF) is negative and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level.    It is consistent with the pecking order theory of financing choices.    The 
coefficient of price-book ratio (ΔPBR) is positive but statistically insignificant.  The 
coefficients of advertising expense (ΔAD), research and development expense (ΔRD) 
and fixed asset ratio (ΔFAR) are negative, positive and positive respectively, but only 
the coefficient of ΔRD is statistically significant at the 1% level.  The positive 
coefficient of ΔRD is not expected based on the discussion in the previous section.  
The coefficient of return on asset (ΔROA) is negative and is statistically significant.  
This result is consistent with the pecking order theory. 
  Statistically significant industry dummies are construction (D1) (at the 1% level), 
transportation (D2) (at the 5% level), information and communication (D3) (at the 5% 
level), retail trade (D5) (at the 5% level) and real estate (D6) (at the 1% level).  The 
signs of these coefficients are positive except for D1.     
  The signs of the coefficients of both large shareholder ratio (LSHARE) and foreign 
shareholder ratio (FSHARE) are positive. The former is statistically significant at the 
10% level and the latter at the 5% level.  This result contradicts the view that firms 
with more effective governance through the existence of large shareholders or foreign 
shareholders have lower debt ratios. 
  The coefficient of corporate group dummy (DGROUP) is negative but statistically 
insignificant.  The recent transformation of corporate groups, such as mergers of the 
largest banks, may weaken the functions corporate groups traditionally perform.   
  Adjusted  R
2 is 0.203 for the regression using all sample firms. 
 
6.2 Results of the regression using only IDP firms 
 
 The results of the regression using only IDP firms are shown in the right column of 
Table 2.  The coefficient of MTR is 0.088 (statistically significant at the 1% level), 
which is larger than in the regression using all sample firms.  Because IDP firms are 
the firms that seem to have intentional debt policies, this result supports the claim that 
the marginal tax rate affects intentional debt policy. 
  The sign of the coefficient of SAFPROB is negative, which is consistent with the 
tradeoff theory, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.  The coefficient of 
ΔNDTS is positive, and the coefficient of NDTSSAF is negative, both of which are 
consistent with MacKie-Mason (1990)’s argument. 
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are the same as in the regression using all sample firms. The coefficients of two of the 
industrial dummies, (D2 (transportation) and D3 (information and communication), 
large shareholder ratio (LSHARE) and foreign shareholder ratio (FSHARE) are 
statically insignificant, whereas they are statistically significant in the regression using 
all sample firms.  However, the statistical significance of the coefficient of D5 (retail 
trade) increases to the 5% level.  The adjusted R
2 of the regression using only IDP 
firms is 0.254, which is a little larger than that of the regression using all sample firms. 
   
6.3 Importance of the effects of marginal tax rates on debt policies of Japanese 
firms 
 
  From the regressions above, it is shown that the marginal tax rate affects the debt 
policy of Japanese firms.  This result is consistent with previous research, such as 
Graham (1996) and Alworth and Arachi (2001), which found significant effects of the 
marginal tax rates on the debt policies of firms in the U.S. and Italy.  It is interesting 
that the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for the marginal tax rates (0.066 in the 
regression using all firms and 0.088 in the regression using only IDP firms) are similar 
to those of U.S. firms (0.069 for all samples in Table 2 of Graham (1996)) and Italian 
firms (0.082 in Table 7 of Alworth and Arachi (2001)). 
  To address the importance of the effects of marginal tax rates, we consider the 
effects of a hypothetical reduction of the marginal tax rate from 31.06% (average for 
IDP firms) to 21.06%. Then, the regression result for IDP firms predicts that the 
increase of debt ratio will decrease by 0.88%.    This effect is not trivial, as the average 
of the change in debt ratio for IDP firms is  －1.048% in FY2008. 
  Many of the other estimated coefficients are consistent with the tradeoff theory, but 
the rest are consistent with the pecking order theory. 
 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
 
  We consider several robustness checks of the main estimation result that the 
marginal tax rate affects the debt policy of Japanese firms.    Because our main concern 
is the effects of the marginal tax rate on debt policy, we report mainly the results 
related to tax-related variables. 
  First, while the debt ratio change in market value that we used in the previous 
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it may reflect not only intentional debt policy but also exogenous equity price shocks 
in stock markets.  To eliminate the effects of unintentional changes in debt ratio, we 
use the debt ratio change in book value rather than market value as a dependent 
variable in the new regression.  Namely, in the definition of the dependent variables 
(equation (8)), shareholders’ equity is measured by book value.    We call the debt ratio 
change measured in book value “ΔDEBT(Book)”.  Other variables remain the same 
as before.  The estimation results of the regressions with ΔDEBT(Book) using all 
sample firms and using only IDP firms are shown in Table 3. 
  The coefficients for marginal tax rate (MTR) are 0.069 in the regression using all 
sample firms and 0.091 in the regression using only IDP firms.  Both of them are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Thus, even when the debt ratio change in 
book value is used as a dependent variable, it is shown that the marginal tax rate affects 
the debt policy of Japanese firms. 
  Second, Graham (1996) points out that not only the marginal tax rate but also the 
variance of the marginal tax rate matters for the debt policy of U.S. firms.  To check 
this possibility, we add the standard deviation of the marginal tax rates (MTRDEV) to 
the regressions using all sample firms and using only IDP firms.  Namely, when we 
estimate the expected marginal tax rates for each firm, we simulate the marginal tax 
rates 10,000 times based on the procedure explained in subsection 3-(2).  The 
standard deviation of these 10,000 simulated values of marginal tax rates for each firm 
is used as a control variable, MTRDEV, in the regressions. 
  The results of the regressions including MTRDEV are shown in Table 4.  The 
coefficients of MTRDEV in the regressions using all sample firms and using only IDP 
firms are statistically insignificant.  Thus, for Japanese firms, the variance of the 
marginal tax rates seems to have no significant effects on the debt policy of Japanese 
firms.    In these regressions, while the statistical significance is lower than before, the 
coefficients of the marginal tax rates (MTR) are positive.  Even in the regressions 
using the standard deviation of the marginal tax rates as a control variable, we confirm 
that the marginal tax rate itself affects debt policy. 
    Thirdly, in estimating the marginal tax rate, we calculate the marginal increase of the 
present value of the tax bill caused by an increase of one Japanese yen in taxable 
income for every year.  However, Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996) consider the 
marginal increase of the present value of the tax bill caused by an increase of one in 
taxable income only for the initial year of the simulation period.  Following their 
approach, we consider the marginal increase of the present value of the tax bill caused 
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simulation period and calculate the marginal tax rate.  Using the newly estimated 
marginal tax rate (“MTR (one period)” in short), we obtain regressions with all the 
other control variables remaining the same.    The regression results are shown in Table 
5.  The estimated coefficients for MTR (one period) are positive and statistically 
significant, so that the change of this assumption does not change the conclusion that 
the marginal tax rate affects the debt policy of Japanese firms. 
Finally, we implicitly assume that the magnitudes of the marginal effects of the 
marginal tax rates on the debt policy of firms are the same for all firms. However, it is 
possible that firms with more effective corporate governance or more CFOs having 
better knowledge of modern corporate finance theory may have a stronger response of 
debt policy to marginal tax rates
8.  To  explore  such  possibilities, we add three cross 
terms, MTR*ΔSIZE, MTR*LSHARE and MTR*FSHARE, to the regressions 
simultaneously.  MTR*ΔSIZE is added because larger firms are considered to have 
more CFOs with greater knowledge of modern corporate finance in Japan.   
MTR*LSHARE is added because firms with more large shareholders are considered to 
have more effective corporate governance.  MTR*FSHARE is added because firms 
with more foreign shareholders are considered to have more effective corporate 
governance in Japan.  The estimation results of the regression with MTR*ΔSIZE, 
MTR*LSHARE and MTR*FSHARE in addition to the control variables in the 
previous regression are shown in Table 6.  While both of them are statistically 
insignificant, the signs of the estimated coefficients for MTR*ΔSIZE and 
MTR*FSHARE in the regressions using all samples and using only IDP firms are 
positive.    These results are consistent with the claim that the marginal tax rates affect 
debt policy more in the case of firms with more CFOs with better knowledge of 
modern corporate finance theory.  However, the coefficients for MTR*LSHARE are 
negative and are statically insignificant.  Because all of the coefficients of the three 
cross terms are statistically insignificant, it is difficult to confirm that the marginal tax 




8. Further Estimation with Panel Data 
 
                                                        
8  This possibility is pointed out by Professor Shinichi Hirota of Waseda University.    We greatly 
appreciate his suggestions. 
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  So far, we have concentrated on the cross section regression with debt ratio change 
in FY2008.    However, because we cannot deny that the debt policy of Japanese firms 
may reflect some events specific to FY2008, it is desirable to have an estimation with 
cross section and panel analysis using data not only from FY2008 but also from the 
fiscal years before FY2008.  Unfortunately, there is one disadvantage a regression 
using multiple fiscal years’ data.  In the regression in the previous sections, we use 
the data of eight fiscal years from FY2000 to FY2007 to estimate taxable income series 
by equation (1) and to estimate the marginal tax rate for FY2007.    However, because 
the concept of “net tax deferred assets” was first introduced to the Japanese accounting 
standard in FY2000, we can calculate taxable income by this method only since 
FY2000.  Thus, to estimate the marginal tax rates in the fiscal years before FY2008, 
we need to estimate taxable income series using the data from shorter periods.  This 
reduction may weaken the accuracy of the estimation of taxable income series and of 
the marginal tax rates. 
  Despite this possible disadvantage, we estimate the (expected) marginal tax rates at 
the ends of FY2005 and FY2006 using data for six years instead of eight years.  
Furthermore, to have a panel with consistent data, we also estimate the marginal tax 
rate at the end of FY2007 using the data for only six years. 
  To estimate the (expected) marginal tax rate at the end of FY2005, we assume that 
firm i’s taxable income follows a random walk with drift defined by equation (11) 
(which is the same as equation (1).)     
  
△  TIi t = μi+εi t                                               ( 1 1 )  
         
The drift and white noise of this equation are estimated from taxable income calculated 
from the actual financial data of individual firms during sample periods between 
FY2000 and FY2005.  Using equation (11) with the estimated drift and white noise, 
we forecast firm i’s taxable income during the simulation period between FY2005 and 
FY2019.   Then, following the same procedure explained in Section 3, we estimate the 
(expected) marginal tax rate at the end of FY2005. 
  To estimate the (expected) marginal tax rate at the end of FY2006, we also assume 
that firm i’s taxable income follows a random walk with drift defined by equation (11).   
The drift and white noise of this equation are estimated from taxable income calculated 
from the actual financial data of individual firms during sample periods between 
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we forecast firm i’s taxable income during the simulation period between FY2006 and 
FY2020. 
  Furthermore, as explained above, to obtain a consistent panel of data, we also 
re-estimate the (expected) marginal tax rate at the end of FY2007 with the data for 
only 6 fiscal years, namely, from FY2002 to FY2007.  Except for this change, the 
estimation procedure is the same as before.     
 
8.2 Cross Section Regressions for FY2006, FY2007 and FY2008 
 
  Using the marginal tax rates derived above, we have cross section regressions 
regarding the debt policy of Japanese firms in FY2006, FY2007 and FY2008.     
    For the regression for FY2006, we use the same dependent variable (ΔDEBT defined 
by equation (8)) and control variables as in the regression explained in Section 4.    The 
values of these variables are taken from the values of FY2006, except for MTR.  The 
marginal tax rate at the end of FY2005, estimated above, is used for MTR.  The 
sample firms with larger ΔDEBT than “μ(average of ΔDEBT)+5σ(standard deviation of 
ΔDEBT)” or smaller ΔDEBT than “μ－5σ” are excluded as outliers.     
  The regression for FY2007 also uses the same dependent and control variables in 
FY2007, except for MTR (which is the marginal tax rate at the end of FY2006 
estimated above.)  Other procedures are the same as in the regression regarding debt 
policy in FY2006.    Also, we have the regression for FY2008, but with the marginal tax 
rate (MTR) estimated using the data only from FY2002 to FY2007, as explained above.   
The basic statistics of the dependent and control variables in FY2006 and FY2007 are 
shown in Table 7.  The basic statistics of the dependent and control variables in 
FY2008 and the panel data (from FY2006-2008) are shown in the left column of Table 
8. 
  The cross section regression results for FY2006, FY2007 and FY2008 are shown in 
Table 9.  Because both the regressions using all sample firms (except outliers) and 
using only IDP firms have similar results, we only report the regression results using all 
sample firms (excluding the outliers) in the cross section regression, the pooled cross 
section and the panel data analysis.
9  
  In all estimation results for FY2006, FY2007 and FY2008, the coefficients of MTR 
are statistically significant at the 1% level.  This stable positive relation between the 
                                                        
9  The cross section regression results using only IDP firms for FY2006, FY2007 and FY2008, 
reported in Kunieda (2010), are similar to the regression results using all sample firms.     
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unstable relation between the marginal tax rate and the debt policy of U.S. firms in 
different years shown in Graham (1996). 
  Although some of them are statistically insignificant, the coefficients for the 
bankruptcy probability index SAFPROB are all negative, which is consistent with the 
tradeoff theory. 
    The signs of the coefficients for non-debt tax shield (ΔNDTS) and NDTS*SAFPROB 
(NDTSSAF) are mixed.  While the signs in the regression for FY2008 are consistent 
with the findings of MacKie-Mason (1990), those in the regressions for FY2006 and 
FY2007 are not. 
    For all three years, the signs on free cash flow (ΔFCF), firm size (ΔSIZE) and return 
on asset (ΔROA) are negative, positive and negative respectively.  The  coefficients  for 
those variables are statistically  significant.  The  signs  of the coefficients of price book 
ratio (ΔPBR) and fixed asset ratio (ΔFAR) are mixed.  Among the coefficients for 
industry dummies, only those of D2 (Transportation) and D6 (Real estate) are 
statistically significant for all three years.  The coefficients for corporate governance 
(FSHARE, LSHARE and DGROUP) are statistically insignificant except in FY2008. 
Thus, these results clearly support that the marginal tax rates affect the debt policies 
of Japanese firms. 
 
 
8.3 Panel Data Analysis 
 
    We conduct the pooled cross section regression using all three years’ samples (except 
for the outliers explained in the previous section.)    The basic statistics of the panel data 
are shown in the right column of Table 8.  The results of the pooled cross section are 
shown in the left column of Table 10.   
The coefficient of MTR is 0.099, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Again, it is confirmed that the marginal tax rate affects the debt policy of Japanese firms.   
The coefficient of SAFROB is negative, which is consistent with the tradeoff theory, 
although it is statistically insignificant.  The signs of the coefficients of ΔNDTS and 
NDTSSAF are both positive, but only the coefficient of NDTSSAF is statistically 
significant.    These signs are not consistent with MacKie-Mason (1990)’s argument.     
    The signs of the coefficients for ΔFCF, ΔPBR, ΔSIZE, ΔFAR and ΔROA are negative, 
negative, positive, negative and negative respectively.  The coefficients for these 
variables are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  Among the coefficients for 
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(real estate) are statically significant. All the control variables related to corporate 
governance (LSHRA, FSHARE, and DGROUP) are statistically insignificant.  The 
adjusted R
2 is 0.277.  Thus, the pooled cross section regression also confirms that the 
marginal tax rate affects the debt policy of Japanese firms. 
  Adding year-specific dummies for FY2006, FY2007 and FY2008, we also conduct 
the regression using the panel data with all sample firms except the outliers in those 
three years.  The results of the regressions using the panel data with year-specific 
dummies are shown in the right column of Table 10.    The coefficient of MTR is 0.113 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  With year-specific dummies, the 
estimated coefficient of MTR is a little larger than the estimated coefficient in the 
pooled cross section regression.  Again, it is confirmed that the marginal tax rate 
affects the debt policy of Japanese firms.    The coefficient of SAFPROB is negative but 
statistically insignificant.  Both of the coefficients of NDTS and NDTSSAF are 
positive, but only the coefficient of NDTSSAF is statistically significant.  The 
coefficients of the remaining control variables are similar to those in the pooled cross 
section regression, with a few exceptions.  The  adjusted  R  is  0.294.   
  Thus, the regression using the panel data with year dummies supports that the 
marginal tax rate affects the debt policy of Japanese firms. 
  Also, we conduct the regression using the same panel data with both year-specific 
dummies and firm-specific dummies.  Industry dummies and the DGROUP dummy 
are excluded from the control variables because they are redundant when the control 
variables include all firm-specific dummies.  The results are shown in the left column 
of Table 11.    The coefficient of MTR is still positive, but its magnitude is much smaller 
than in the previous regressions.  Also, it is statistically insignificant.  The other 
variables, such as NDTSSAF, Δ FCF, ΔPBR, ΔSIZE, ΔFAR and ΔROA, continue to be 
statistically significant.   
  Instead of a fixed-effect model, we also conduct a random-effect model regression.  
The result is shown in the right column of Table 11.     
    The estimated coefficient of MTR is 0.080, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  The coefficient of SAFPROB is negative, but it is statistically insignificant.  
Both of the coefficients of NDTS and NDTSSAF are positive, but only the coefficient 
of NDTSSAF is statistically significant.  The other variables, such as  Δ FCF, ΔPBR, 
ΔSIZE, ΔFAR and ΔROA, continue to be statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  To determine whether the random-effect model or the fixed-effect model is more 
appropriate, the Hausman specification test is frequently used.  However, because we 
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assumptions for the Hausman specification test does not hold.    Instead of the Hausman 
specification test, we apply the test proposed by Arellano (1993), which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  By  Arellano (1993)’s test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
fixed effects do not exist at the 5% significance level.  Thus, we cannot reject the 
estimation result of the random-effect regression showing that the marginal tax rate has 
significant effects on Japanese corporations’ debt policy. 
  In conclusion, we can claim that the marginal tax rate affects the debt policy of 
Japanese firms in our panel data (from FY2006 to FY2008) analysis. 
 
 
9.  Concluding  Remarks  
 
  In the first empirical study of the relationship between firm-specific marginal tax 
rates and the debt ratio changes of individual firms in Japan, we have found a positive 
relationship between them in most cases.  This result is consistent with the claim that 
marginal tax rates significantly affect the debt policies of Japanese firms.  It is also 
consistent with previous findings by the empirical studies of the debt policies of U. S. 
firms (Graham (1996)) and Italian firms (Alworth and Arachi (2001)) 
  From the point of view of tax policy, this result proves that asymmetric treatment of 
equity and debt in the current Japanese corporate tax system distorts the debt policies of 
Japanese firms.  Thus, it is desirable to have corporate tax reform in the direction 
toward equal tax treatment of debt and equity in Japan.     
Because the effects of marginal tax rate on debt policy are so crucial not only for 
understanding the capital structure of firms but also for evaluating various corporate tax 
system reform proposals, further study of the effects of tax policy on the debt policy of 
Japanese firms is strongly desirable.  We hope that this empirical study contributes to 
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  31Table  1.  Basic  Statistics 
Samples      All Sample Firms      Only IDP Firms 
    Average   
Standard 
Deviation 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variable    
   △DEBT    －0. 718  6.109    －1.048    7.591 
Control Variables    
Marginal tax rate (MTR)    31.868     9.507     31.057      9.881 
Bankruptcy probability index 
(SAFPROB) 
   0.386     0.061  0.395      0.061 
Non-debt tax shield (△NDTS)     0. 003     0.005       0. 003      0.006 
NDTS*SAFPROB (NDTSSAF)      0. 011     0.008       0. 011      0.008 
Free cash flow (△FCF)  
(in billion JPY) 
   2.611    78.690     －2.313     70.209 
Price-book ratio of capital 
(△PBR) 
   1.712  1.145       1. 849     1.230 
Firm size  (△SIZ E)     0. 021     0.046       0. 199     0.049 
Advertising expense (△AD)     0. 009  0.780     －0.012     0.541 
Research and Development 
(△RD) 
0.079     0.941       0. 088     1.014 
Fixed asset ratio (△FAR)      0. 294     0.166       0. 291     0.168 
Return on asset (△ROA)     0. 059     0.058       0. 050     0.056 
D1 (construction)   0.071  0.257       0. 089     0.285 
D2 (transportation)      0. 036     0.185       0. 032     0.177 
D3 (information and 
communication) 
    0.061     0.240       0. 051     0.219 
D4 (wholesale trade)      0. 091     0.287       0. 098     0.298 
D5 (retail trade)      0. 068     0.251       0. 070     0.255 
D6 (real estate)      0. 027     0.163       0. 038     0.190 
D7 (service)      0. 046     0.210       0. 040      0.196 
Large shareholder ratio (LSHARE)     47.339    14.178      46. 922     14.090 
Foreign shareholder (FSHARE)    14.428    11.956     13.463     11.394 
Corporate group dummy 
(DGROUP) 
  0.092     0.290      0.097     0.296 
Number of observations        1211      772 
 
  32Table 2.    Regressions Using All Sample Firms and Only IDP Firms 
Dependant Variable                     △DEBT 
Sam ples       A ll Sam ple Firm s       O nly ID P Firm s  
Control Variables   
C  -2.740 (-0.99)   -4.362 (-1.04) 
MTR  0.066 (-2.96) ***  0.088 (2.89) *** 
SAFPROB  -5.977 (-1.05)  -6.110 (-0.73) 
△NDTS  99.372 (2.14) **  134.613 (2.02) ** 
NDTSSAF  -33.766 (-1.01)  -71.558 (-1.58) 
△FCF  -0.008 (-3.26) ***  -0.015 (-4.81) *** 
△PBR  0.229 (0.84)  0.455 (1.31) 
△SIZE  39.118 (5.76) ***  47.651 (5.70) *** 
△AD  -0.250 (-1.04)  0.214 (0.38)  
△RD  0.572 (3.01) ***  0.586 (2.52) ** 
△FAR  0.699 (0.46)  2.034 (0.96)  
△ROA  -19.701 (-3.16) ***  -25.165 (-2.94) ***  
D1  -2.899 (-3.51) ***  -3.286 (-3.16) ***  
D2  1.573 (1.99) **  1.683 (1.48) 
D3  1.145 (1.99) **  0.881 (0.86) 
D4  -0.139 (-0.20)  -0.109 (-0.11) 
D5  1.279 (1.89) *  2.057 (2.04) ** 
D6  6.631 (3.47) ***  6.937 (3.03) *** 
D7  0.907 (0.98)  0.890 (0.57) 
LSHARE  0.031 (1.71) *  0.030 (1.00) 
FSHARE  0.029 (1.97) **  0.033 (1.45) 
DGROUP  -0.186 (-0.37)  -0.318 (-0.43) 
Adjusted R
2      0.203  0.254 
Number of obs.  1211  772 
Mean (ΔDEBT)  -0.718  -1.048 
  33 Table  3.  Regressions  with  ΔDEBT(Book) 
 
Observations  All sample firms  Only IDP firms 
Control Variables    
C  -3.746 (-1.118)  -5.714 (-1.271) 
MTR   0.069 (2.607)  ***  0.091 (2.671) *** 
SAFPROB  -6.579 (-0.978)  -6.210 (-0.697) 
△NDTS  105.376 (2.628) ***  128.625 (2.517) ** 
NDTSSAF  -39.790 (-1.038)  -81.767 (-1.661) * 
△FCF  -0.018 (-3.346) ***  -0.028 (-8.247) *** 
△PBR  0.332 (1.098)  0.590 (1.650) * 
△SIZE  53.057 (6.269) ***  61.554 (6.355) *** 
△AD  -0.330 (-0.915)  0.192 (0.306)  
△RD  1.316 (2.697) ***  1.273 (2.600) *** 
△FAR  1.708 (0.835)  2.578 (0.982) 
△ROA  -23.052(-2.890) ***  -24.482 (-2.448) ** 
D1  -2.499 (-2.745) **  -3.090 (-2.728) *** 
D2  2.055 (1.953)  2.209 (1.685) * 
D3  2.238 (2.572) **  2.218 (1.816) * 
D4  0.349 (0.452)  0.362 (0.342) 
D5  1.960 (2.071) **  2.7606 (2.274) ** 
D6  8.586 (3.133) ***  8.714 (2.779) *** 
D7  1.845 (1.605)  2.582 (1.678) * 
LSHARE  0.029 (1.573)  0.033 (1.308) 
FSHARE  0.056 (2.210) **  0.067 (1.878) ** 
DGROUP  -0.109 (-0.144)  0.149 (0.154) 
Adjusted R
2  0.243      0.296 
Number of obs.  1211      874 
Mean (△DEBT (Book))  -0.538    -0.702 
 
 
  34Table 4.    Regressions with MTRDEV as a Control Variable 
Samples       All s am ple firm s         O nly  IDP firm s  
Control Variables   
C  -1.635 (-0.56)  -3.017 (-0.66) 
MTR  0.051 (1.96) *  0.072 (2.03) ** 
MTRDEV  -0.052 (-1.26)  -0.057 (-0.97) 
SAFPROB  -6.217 (-1.09)  -6.637 (-0.79) 
△NDTS  98.356 (2.12) **  133.275 (1.99) ** 
NDTSSAF  -30.810 (-0.92)  -68.104 (-1.50) 
△FCF  -0.008 (-3.18) ***  -0.015 (-4.76) *** 
△PBR  0.216 (0.79)  0.438 (1.27) 
△SIZE  38.792 (5.68) ***  47.269 (5.61) *** 
△AD  -0.233 (-0.97)  0.207 (0.36) 
△RD  0.568 (3.04) ***   0.579 (2.54) ** 
△FAR  0.605 (0.39)  1.957 (0.91) 
△ROA  -20.669 (-3.36) ***  -26.329 (-3.12) *** 
D1  -2.893 (-3.51) ***  -3.309 (-3.19) *** 
D2  1.610 (2.01) **  1.691 (1.48)  
D3  1.183 (2.05) **  0.889 (0.87) 
D4  -0.154 (-0.22)   -0.132(-0.13) 
D5  1.223 (1.81)   1.962 (1.95) * 
D6  6.646 (3.47) ***   6.994 (3.04) *** 
D7  0.884 (0.96)  0.811 (0.52) 
ＬSHARE  0.028 (1.56)  0.028 (0.89) 
ＦSHARE  0.029 (1.95) *  0.033 (1.43) 
DGROUP  -0.182 (-0.36)  -0.312 (-0.43) 
Adjusted R
2  0.204  0.254 
Number of obs.  1211  772 
  35Table 5.    Regression with MTR (1 year) 
Samples  All sample firms  Only IDP firms 
Control Variables   
C  -5.879 (-2.007)  -8.304 (-1.942) 
MTR (1 year)  0.104 (4.422) ***  0.132 (4.437) *** 
SAFPROB  -2.563 (-0.442)  -1.206 (-0.144) 
△NDTS  102.314 (2.277) **  135.078 (2.114) ** 
NDTSSAF  -44.796 (-1.348)  -85.394 (-1.909) * 
△FCF  -0.008 (-3.363) *** -0.015 (-5.000) *** 
△PBR  0.225 (0.827)   0.436 (1.258) 
△SIZE  39.513 (5.815) ***  48.588 (5.837) *** 
△AD  -0.272 (-1.131)  0.209 (0.373) 
△RD  0.586 (3.053) ***  0.600 (2.549) ** 
△FAR  0.960 (0.648)  2.195 (1.058) 
△ROA  -18.130 (-2.965) ***  -23.288 (-2.756) ***
D1  -2.858 (-3.511) *** -3.275 (-3.223) *** 
D2  1.333 (1.702) *  1.581 (1.401) 
D3  1.069 (1.858) *  0.833 (0.812) 
D4  -0.175 (-0.250)  -0.197 (-0.193) 
D5  1.280 (1.869) *  2.069 (2.023) ** 
D6  6.148 (3.288) ***  6.329 (2.832) *** 
D7  0.971 (1.053)  1.048 (0.673) 
FSHARE  0.031 (2.126) **  0.030 (1.014) 
LSHARE  0.032 (1.784) *  -0.234 (-0.316) 
DGROUP  -0.136 (-0.271)  0.035 (1.548) 
Adjusted R
2    0.213  0.266 
Number of obs.   1211   772 
 
  36Table 6.    Regression with Cross Terms MTR*ΔSIZE, MTR*LSHARE and MTR*FSHARE 
Observations  All sample firms  Only IDP firms 
Control Variables    
C  -4.711 (-1.236)  -7.384 (-1.340) 
MTR   0.134 (1.934) *  0.185 (1.911) * 
MTR*△SIZE  0.840 (1.443)  1.114 (1.517) 
MTR*ＬSHARE  -0.002 (-1.475)  -0.003 (-1.338) 
MTR*FSHARE  0.002 (0.928)  0.001 (0.397) 
SAFPROB  -6.235 (-1.097)  -5.652 (-0.677) 
△NDTS  102.582 (2.186) **  137.471 (2.053) ** 
NDTSSAF  -31.604 (-0.940)  -67.606 (-1.487)  
△FCF    -0.008 (-3.286) ***  -0.015 (-4.657) *** 
△PBR  0.238 (0.873)  0.450 (1.292) 
△SIZE  13.850 (0.700)  14.149 (0.569) 
△AD  -0.276 (-1.192)  0.167 (0.298) 
△RD     0.531 (2.712) ***  0.538 (2.156) ** 
△FAR  0.600 (0.387)  1.865 (0.859) 
△ROA    -20.390 (-3.218) ***  -25.558 (-2.955) *** 
D1     -2.975 (-3.620) ***  -3.378 (-3.256) *** 
D2   1.509 (1.884) *  1.511 (1.318) 
D3    1.248 (2.171) **  0.988 (0.971) 
D4  -0.117 (-0.166)  -0.091 (0.088) 
D5   1.242 (1.839) *  1.999 (1.988) ** 
D6     6.775 (3.547) ***  7.119 (3.094) *** 
D7  0.903 (0.960)  0.777 (0.487) 
LSHARE  0.092 (1.867) *    0.108 (1.647) * 
FSHARE   -0.026 (-0.400)  -0.006 (-0.068) 
DGROUP  -0.294 (-0.604)  -0.430 (-0.611) 
Adjusted R
2  0.208  0.258 
Number of obs.        1 2 1 3   772 
  37Table 7.    Basic Statistics of FY2006, and 2007 Cross Section Data Using All Sample Firms 
Period            FY 2006            FY 2007 
    Average   
Standard 
Deviation 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variable    
   △DEBT  2.010    6.939  3.902  10.013   
Control Variables                 
Marginal tax rate (MTR)  30.942  9.079  30.437  10.204 
Bankruptcy probability index 
(SAFPROB)  0.320    0.041    0.426    0.066   
Non-debt tax shield (△NDTS)  0.001    0.0051  0.002  0.008   
NDTS*SAFPROB (NDISSAF)  0.009    0.007    0.010  0.008   
Free cash flow (△FCF)  
(in billion JPY)  5.996  65.507    1.413    63.780 
Price-book ratio of capital 
(△PBR)  0.674    0.339  0.791    0.402 
Firm size (△SIZE)  0.031  0.057    0.062    0.083   
Advertising expense (△AD)  0.043    0.447    0.084  0.777 
Research and Development 
(△RD)  0.114  0.846    0.204  1.203 
Fixed asset ratio (△FAR)  0.288  0.162  0.287  0.163 
Return on asset (△ROA)  0.060    0.060    0.063  0.053 
D1 (construction)  0.070    0.2559    0.071  0.256   
D2 (transportation)  0.036    0.187    0.036    0.186   
D3 (information and 
communication)  0.061    0.240    0.062  0.240 
D4 (wholesale trade)  0.091  0.288  0.091  0.288   
D5 (retail trade)  0.069  0.253    0.069  0.254 
D6 (real estate)  0.024  0.154    0.027  0.161 
D7 (service)  0.046  0.210  0.046    0.209   
Large shareholder ratio (LSHARE)  43.897    17.020    46.995  13.910 
Foreign shareholder (FSHARE)  14.256    11.529    14.789  11.765   
Corporate group dummy 
(DGROUP)  0.092  0.289  0.091    0.287   
Number of observations      1193         1204 
  38Table 8.  Basic Statistics of FY2008 (Explained in Sec. 6) and Panel Data Using All Sample 
Firms 
Period            FY 2008    panel (FY2006-08) 
    Average   
Standard 
Deviation 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent Variable    
   △DEBT  -0.718  6.109    1.726  8.092   
Control Variables                 
Marginal tax rate (MTR)  32.946  8.847    31.446    9.455 
Bankruptcy probability index 
(SAFPROB)  0.386    0.061  0.377  0.072   
Non-debt tax shield (△NDTS)  0.003    0.005    0.002    0.006   
NDTS*SAFPROB (NDISSAF)  0.011    0.007    0.010  0.008   
Free cash flow (△FCF)  
(in billion JPY)  2.611    65.507    3.331    69.683 
Price-book ratio of capital 
(△PBR)  1.712    0.339    1.061    0.865 
Firm size (△SIZE)  0.021    0.057    0.038  0.066   
Advertising expense (△AD)  0.009    0.447    0.045  0.687   
Research and Development 
(△RD)  0.079    0.846    0.132    1.009   
Fixed asset ratio (△FAR)  0.294  0.162    0.290    0.164 
Return on asset (△ROA)  0.059    0.060    0.061  0.057   
D1 (construction)  0.071    0.256    0.071    0.256   
D2 (transportation)  0.036    0.187  0.036  0.186   
D3 (information and 
communication)  0.061    0.240    0.061    0.240   
D4 (wholesale trade)  0.091  0.288    0.091    0.288   
D5 (retail trade)  0.068    0.253    0.069    0.253   
D6 (real estate)  0.027    0.154  0.026  0.159   
D7 (service)  0.046    0.210    0.046  0.210   
Large shareholder ratio (LSHARE)  47.339    17.020    46.086    15.168   
Foreign shareholder (FSHARE)  14.428    11.529    14.492    11.751   
Corporate group dummy 
(DGROUP)  0.093    0.289    0.092    0.289   
Number of observations         1211         3608 
  39Table 9.    Results of Cross Section Regression for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008 
 
  FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 
C  6.767 (1.476)  6.105 (1.462)       -3.492 (-1.261) 
MTR    0.090(3.095)***       0.15 3 （5.453 ）** *  0. 080 (3.594) *** 
SAFPROB   -23.416(-2.027)**   -9.492 （-1.258）  -5.727 (-1.010) 
△NDTS  -74.910（-1.012）  83.452 (1.324)  94.279 （2.063）** 
NDTSSAF    247.222(5.204)***  159.334 (3.804)***  -31.063 （-0.933） 
△FCF   -0.013（-3.668）***  -0.015 (-2.238)**  -0.008 （-3.215）*** 
△PBR   -0.568（-0.660）  -1.154 (-1.292)  0.209 (0.759) 
△SIZE     3 6.863 （4. 841）***  62.125（8.929）***    39.174（5.781）*** 
△AD  -0.200 （-0.388）  -0.529 （-1.478）  -0.217（-0.917） 
△RD   -0.250(-0.722)  -0.702 （-2.718）*** 0.571（3.001）*** 
△FAR  -8.686（-4.723）***  -14.772 （-6.853）*** 0.838 （0.553） 
△ROA  -22.805 （-2.880）*** -59.459（-6.319）***  -19.865 （-3.208）*** 
D1  -0.932（-0.979）  -0.254 （-0.221）  -2.889 （-3.524）*** 
D2     1.9 12 （2. 093）**   2.917（2.450）**  1.579 （1.993）** 
D3   -0.674 （-0.807）   -2.406 （-1.837）*  1.347 （2.289）** 
D4   1.933（2.570）**   1.679 （1.934）*  -0.113 （-0.160） 
D5  0.066（0.091）  1.296 （1.282）    1.378 （2.042）** 
D6  4.235 （2.174） **    11.475 （4.005）***  6.691 （3.499）*** 
D7   -0.835 （-0.856）  0.166 （0.109）  1.022 （1.112） 
LSHARE    0.014 （1.054）   0.007 （0.358）      0.031 （2.095）** 
FSHARE   0.013 （0.543）  -0.016 （-0.597）  0.031（1.753）*   
DGROUP   0.575 （0.876）  0.111 （0.155）  -0.222 （-0.440） 
Adjusted R
2  0.162  0.393        0.206           
Number of obs.  1193  1204         121 1  
Mean (ΔDEBT)  2.010   3.902       －0.71 8 
  40Table 10.    Results of Pooled Cross Section and Panel Regressions 
 
  Pooled  Cross  Section    Panel with Year-specific 
Dummies 
C  0.261 (0.200)   -0.525 (-0.242)  
MTR  0.099 (5.530) ***  0.113 （6.315）*** 
SAFPROB  -2.602 (-0.940)    -4.582 （-0.954） 
△NDTS  32.774 (0.670)    52.128 （1.033） 
NDTSSAF  127.584 (4.684) ***  117.537 （4.273）*** 
△FCF  -0.012 (-4.530) ***  -0.012 （-4.518）*** 
△PBR  -0.940 (-4.269) ***  -0.101 （-0.400） 
△SIZE  53.996 (9.377) ***  50.435 （8.623）*** 
△AD  -0.425 (-1.657) *  -0.410 （-1.753）* 
△RD  -0.263 (-1.387)  -0.266 （-1.359） 
△FAR  -7.816 (-6.118) ***  -7.441 （-5.918）*** 
△ROA  -27.914 (-7.210) ***  -26.903 （-6.403）*** 
D1  -1.375 (-2.105) **  -1.440 （-2.247）** 
D2  1.874 (2.542) **  2.072 （2.834）*** 
D3  -0.707 (-1.067)  -0.466 （-0.699） 
D4  1.230 (2.391) **  1.182 （2.323）** 
D5  0.737 (1.490)  0.894 （1.779）* 
D6  7.687 (4.387) ***  7.429 （4.271）*** 
D7  -0.117  (-0.1 3 7)      0.073  （ 0. 086） 
ＬSHARE  0.013 (1.340)  0.016（1.686） *  
ＦSHARE  0.008 (0.664)      0.011  （ 0. 890） 
DG RO UP  -0.136  (-0.3 2 2)      0.146  （ 0. 346） 
Adjusted R
2  0.277   0.294 
Number of obs.  3608   3608 
  41Table 11.    Fixed Effect Model (Year- and Firm-specific Effects) and Random Effect Model 
 
  Fixed effect model (year-
 and firm-specific effects)  Random effect model 
C  12.539 (2.040)**  0.917 (0.749) 
MTR  0.011（0.395）     0 . 0 8 0  （ 4 . 525）*** 
SAFPROB  -11.317 （-0.827）  -1.551（-0.608） 
△NDTS  31.403 （0.412）  31.463 （0.684） 
NDTSSAF  327.165 （3.056）***  144.297 （5.178）*** 
△FCF  -0.014 （-4.132）**  -0.0125 （-4.773）*** 
△PBR  -1.341 （-2.824）***   -1.259 （-5.734）*** 
△SIZE  36.018 （4.758）***  51.855 （9.180）*** 
△AD  -0.338 （-1.260）  -0.457 （-1.823）* 
△RD  -0.183 （-0.779）  -0.243 （-1.321） 
△FAR  -28.540 （-2.571）**  -8.574 （-6.387）*** 
△ROA    -36.495 （-3.797）***  -27.160 （-6.821）*** 
D1    -1.463 （-2.197）** 
D2    1.985 （2.650）*** 
D3    -0.835 （-1.243） 
D4    1.281 （2.455）** 
D5    0.701 （1.361） 
D6    8.236 （4.388）*** 
D7    -0.113 （-0.132） 
ＬSHARE  0.013 (1.340)  0.012（1.239）  
ＦSHARE  0.008 (0.664)  0.010 （0.782） 
DGROUP    -0.217 （-0.502） 
Adjusted R
2  0.277  0.261 
Number of obs.  3608  3608 
 
  42Figure 1.    Debt Ratio of Japanese Listed Firms 
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（出所）Nikkei NEEDS.    The average of the debt ratios of Japanese listed firms (excluding banks, 
security companies and insurance companies) with more than 25 years financial data. “Debt ratio” is 
defined as “Total liability /Total capital (book value).” 
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